A Decade Of Support To Pro-Democracy And Human Rights Movements

Trends and lessons learned

by Hardy Merriman,
International Center on Nonviolent Conflict

The 2013 launch of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) came at a time of anxious debate about the state of democracy worldwide. Indicators showed moderate democratic recession starting approximately five to seven years prior to this date, but it was not clear how sustained or sharp the trend would become.¹ Reflecting this ambivalence, the 2013 Democracy Index report was titled Democracy in Limbo. Deliberation about the significance of the recession continued in ensuing years—in 2015, the Journal of Democracy dedicated its 25^th anniversary issue to the question “Is Democracy in Decline?”, with one of the journal’s editors commenting that “this seemed to be the question that everyone was asking as 2015 approached.”²

The current autocratic wave has accelerated rapidly, with alarming evidence that democracy is in crisis globally. Roughly a decade later, the debate has changed. After a slow start, the current autocratic wave has accelerated rapidly, with alarming evidence that democracy is in crisis globally. Conversations now centre on what the global democratic community—states, multilaterals, civil society organisations, diaspora populations, and others—should do to respond.

EED is well-positioned to play a leading role in such crucial efforts. Its mandate to “support those who believe in democratic futures for their countries and societies” and to provide assistance that is “demand-driven and flexible, and that constantly adapts to local and political realities” aligns with insights gleaned over the last decade about the central role of mobilised populations and movements in reversing the autocratic tide.

A growing body of research finds that bottom-up pressure from popular civil resistance movements—using tactics like strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, acts of non-cooperation and other nonviolent tactics—are historically one of the most powerful drivers of democratic gains globally.³ This was true during the third democratic wave (1974-2006) as well over the previous century.⁴ Quantitative research also reveals that movements seeking accountability, human rights, democratic change, or democratic preservation are increasing significantly worldwide.⁵ The European Neighbourhood and beyond saw its share of such movements over the last decade, including in Turkey (2013), Ukraine (2014), Lebanon (2015, 2019), North Macedonia (2016), Slovakia (2017), Armenia (2018), Algeria (2019), Sudan (2019), Iraq (2019), Belarus (2020), Iran (2022), and Georgia (2023).

This rise in movements is not surprising. Autocrats and polarising demagogues hollow out state institutions and repress independent civil society organisations, causing ordinary people to conclude that relying on elections and the legal system is inadequate. Instead, people organise in their communities, foster self-reliance, and mobilise to create social, economic, and political pressure on institutions to live up to their public mandates. As long as institutional channels remain corrupted or broken, we should expect more movements challenging unaccountable leaders and governments.

Entrenched and aspiring autocrats understand this fact and rightly perceive these movements as a threat to their rule. In response, they increasingly coordinate with and support each other. Authoritarians share strategies to clamp down on civil society, infuse surveillance technology into their repressive apparatuses, spread misinformation, offer mutual assistance when they are challenged, and provide cover for each other in multilateral institutions. Built incrementally, these capacities appeared to grow slowly, but their gains have compounded for nearly 20 years and strengthened autocratic resilience. This is evidenced by the fact that civil resistance movements seeking political transitions succeeded 58 percent of the time between 2000 and 2009, but only 34 percent of the time between 2010 and 2019.⁶

Improving pro-democracy movement support

To foster a fourth democratic wave, this trend must be reversed, and the impetus for how this can happen is clear. Democracy’s proponents are found in every country in the world—in populations who mobilise for their rights, seek a better life, and demand accountable rule. Responding to and supporting these populations is a critical strategic opportunity and moral imperative of our time. Thus, as more movements emerge to challenge autocrats, the primary question facing the global democratic community is: are we prepared? What changes should be made now so that democratic actors are ready to offer more impactful support when pro-democracy and human rights movements arise in places like Belarus, Iran, Sudan, and other countries?

Building on research and practice over the last decade, below are several key lessons for how to do so.

Create an enabling environment

Movements have proven able to overcome adverse conditions and succeed against violent autocratic adversaries. However, the more open political space a society has, and the more external actors can constrain and limit an autocrat’s repression, the more conducive the environment is to movement success.

Therefore, democratic foreign policy should seek to foster favourable conditions for movements, and act in greater alignment with movement needs and goals. For example, diplomats should more actively seek out and listen to movement representatives and ask them what assistance they require. Democratic states should apply greater conditionality in trade and security agreements to uphold civic space. Institutions designing sanctions should more actively seek out civil society input.

In addition, just as networks of authoritarian regimes oppose movements, democratic governments can improve collaboration amongst themselves to enable movements. This can include more coordinated efforts to develop rapid and targeted multilateral sanctions; to gather evidence and report on repression by autocrats; to strengthen judicial accountability mechanisms; and to advance an international norm of a “right to assistance”, grounded in the rights of populations to request and receive certain forms of support to advance democratic change.⁷

Adapt the democracy support toolkit

Beyond creating an enabling environment, the global democratic community must also innovate Beyond creating an enabling environment, the global democratic community must also innovate. The world has changed dramatically in ten years—has the pace of adaptation in democracy support kept up?

This can begin with a re-evaluation of current programmes. For example, democracy support approaches that are based on the assumption of a friendly or neutral operating environment may need to be rapidly revised if a country turns hostile or shows signs of backsliding. In countries where independent civil society organisations have been curtailed or outlawed in recent years, programmes may need to be substantially modified to channel support to informal entities. Initiatives that are premised on institutional mechanisms functioning properly may also need to significantly adjust their approach if those institutions become corrupted or captured. Elections, the legal system, and registered CSOs can still have an important role to play in such cases, but expanding support to movements can create space for independent CSOs to function and apply pressure to ensure institutional means work as intended.

Adopt a movement mindset

Democratic actors must also have a “movement mindset” as they consider strategic and tactical options for support.⁸ This approach consists of adopting an expanded concept of civil society, an emphasis on listening to and leadership by local partners, and recognition that flexibility and adaptability are key elements of successful assistance.

Those who wish to help must see traditionally overlooked communities and small or informal groups as potential sources of power Movements often start among marginalised populations (which at times can comprise a large percentage of a country’s population living under autocracy), and key actors within movements may be formal or informal, registered or unregistered. For this reason, those who wish to help must see traditionally overlooked communities and small or informal groups as potential sources of power, and they should actively seek out and listen to those who are organising from these bases. Simple questions, such as “what are you doing?”, “why?”, “what do you want to achieve?”, and “how can we help?” provide the basis for relationship building and potential engagement.

Movements draw their strength from their ability to unify, organise, and mobilise mass participation of ordinary people in strategic and targeted ways Emphasising local ownership and decision-making is also critical in movement work. Movements draw their strength from their ability to unify, organise, and mobilise mass participation of ordinary people in strategic and targeted ways. This means that movement organisers and leaders must be attuned to the grievances and aspirations of various population groups and speak in language that resonates with them. Activists know their own local context best and have the most invested in their country’s path. Thus, external support should seek to supplement, rather than marginalise or replace, local leadership and strategies.

Movements also can be fluid and focus on different issue areas over time. For example, Sudan’s 2019 pro-democracy movement that ended the rule of autocrat Omar al-Bashir has roots in voter registration efforts by the Girifna (“We’re Fed Up”) movement in the 2010 election; in anti-austerity protests that evolved to calls for democracy in 2013; in widespread mubadarat (“initiatives”) and “demand groups” that began engaging local issue-based mobilisation around the country in 2013; and in professional associations that concerned themselves with workers’ wages and working conditions.⁹ Many of these efforts were informal and unregistered, illustrating the fact that movements may also need different modalities on how to apply for, manage, or report back on various forms of assistance. For this reason, flexibility and lowering bureaucratic requirements are often central considerations in working effectively with them.

Coordinate with the broader global democratic community

Lastly, as movements grow, their needs and goals change based on their phase of development and evolving circumstances. This means that a variety of democratic actors are best suited to support movements over time.

One of the most impactful periods to engage with movements is their early organising phase, when they are still forming and before high visibility mobilisation or media coverage.¹⁰ Support for analysis, strategic planning, coalition building, training, and workshops during this crucial phase can constructively influence subsequent developments.¹¹

Once movements shift to peak mobilisation, they are aggressively targeted by their opponents, and enter a period where they need rapid support as activists respond to quickly developing events.

After peak mobilisation, widespread public actions can decrease due to repression and/or exhaustion, but movements continue to fight for their goals during these periods of protracted struggle. Another movement phase occurs during times of transition, in which movements can constructively influence elections and negotiations, and help counter potential spoilers such as coups d’état. Then in the post-transition phase, movements can play a critical role holding new leaders accountable and pushing back on endemic causes of democratic backsliding such as corruption and inequality.

Because no single entity is best situated to address these evolving opportunities and challenges, movement support should be coordinated among diverse actors, both governmental and non-governmental. Each has their own comparative advantages in this work. Research tells us that coordination among movement allies significantly increases the effectiveness of their efforts.¹² Regular convenings to clarify roles and strategies are worth the investment.

APPLYING THESE LESSONS IN THE NEXT DECADE

The trend of increasing movements worldwide is likely to continue, which presents a defining opportunity for democracy advocates. Meeting this circumstance will require shifts in strategies and new options for democracy support. Responses should be based on clear-eyed assessment of present circumstances and future trends, rather than the comfort of the familiar, or outdated practices from the past. Institutional inertia and attitudes of risk aversion cannot become excuses for inaction. Time is not neutral and must be weighed against the urgency and need to respond effectively to the authoritarian threat.

Such insights are already applied at places like the European Endowment for Democracy. Established in the wake of the Arab Uprisings (2010-11), in which policymakers felt underprepared for the pro-democracy uprisings that shook countries across the Middle East and North Africa, movementcentred practices are part of EED’s mission. By supporting the unsupported, it has sought to complement other EU and Member State democracy programmes by reaching groups who may not otherwise be eligible for assistance.

Organisations like EED that embody principles of movement support will be critical players in the next decade’s efforts to advance a more peaceful, just, and democratic world Moreover, in light of current global circumstances, EED’s leading efforts should also be seen as an essential pillar of democracy support in their own right. As populations exert bottom-up pressure on autocrats, organisations like EED that embody principles of movement support will be critical players in the next decade’s efforts to advance a more peaceful, just, and democratic world.

Back to EED 2023 Annual Report